| Author | Message | ||
     strawberry Citizen Username: Strawberry Post Number: 1435 Registered: 10-2001 |
"Look, kids, 9-11 is not the all-purpose response to any criticism of the Administration's policies." Nohero, You're so full of crap it's laughable. Who are you fooling. Bush can never do right in the eyes of "Dumocrats" like yourself, so just shut up already. Arguing with you is like arguing with a hysterical woman. No common sense. "That moment has directly affected my foreign policy. See, it changed the nature of the presidency. It changed the security arrangements of the United States of America. I vowed to the American people I would never forget the lessons of September the 11th, 2001." --President George W. Bush | ||
| strawberry Citizen Username: Strawberry Post Number: 1436 Registered: 10-2001 |
more on nohero. More time in Afghanistan?? We removed the ruling Government, installed a new Government, bombed the piss out of the area which we now occupy. Oh, I see get Bin Laden??? Well, does anyone have a clue what rock he's under. Afghanistan, Pakistan?? No. we don't. But according to you we should hang around Afghanistan, do nothing else until Bin Laden all of a sudden appears. RIGHT?? stupid point, on your part. INSPECTIONS? 8 years of failed inspections. That was more than enough. What would be the point of continuing, so we could again be misled for let's say another eight years?? Chalabi? Yeah, I read your little Newsweek article as well. HOW IN THE WORLD HAS CHALABI HAS A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON ANYTHING WE'VE DONE SO FAR??? (I'll wait for your little link, to try and answer this) HALIBURTON? Give it up. Now you sound like Markel. Always a stupid point, Nohero, Why don't you just cry "no war for oil!" while your at it. Stupid point. Nohero, every time you try and answer something with your own words, you come off weak man, very weak. Thank You "That moment has directly affected my foreign policy. See, it changed the nature of the presidency. It changed the security arrangements of the United States of America. I vowed to the American people I would never forget the lessons of September the 11th, 2001." --President George W. Bush | ||
| Nohero Citizen Username: Nohero Post Number: 2452 Registered: 10-1999  |
Okay, thanks for sharing. Anybody else? | ||
| strawberry Citizen Username: Strawberry Post Number: 1437 Registered: 10-2001 |
As usual Nohero can't take on those who know his routine. Argue a point (often nothing more than the plagiarized thoughts of others). If those points are questioned in a way that puts him on the defensive, he does one of two things, he either refuses to answer or he comes back with a cute little quip. Nohero, here's the deal. You and your other alter ego's have been proven wrong once to many times on this board. Your defense mechanism is showing flaws. Why not just answer one of my questions from above?..Just one, in your own words, You think you can manage that, chicken little? How in the world has Chalabi harmed U.S. policy in a negative way in Iraq? Hey, maybe if you're lucky I'll get suspended again before your forced to act and sound like the misinformed poster we know you to be. I await your whining, bleeding heart liberal, half-ass, mininformed attempt to get this one right. "That moment has directly affected my foreign policy. See, it changed the nature of the presidency. It changed the security arrangements of the United States of America. I vowed to the American people I would never forget the lessons of September the 11th, 2001." --President George W. Bush | ||
| Michael Janay Citizen Username: Childprotect Post Number: 79 Registered: 1-2003 |
OSAMA BIN LADEN and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al Qaeda--perhaps even for Mohamed Atta--according to a top secret U.S. government memorandum obtained by THE WEEKLY STANDARD. The memo, dated October 27, 2003, was sent from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith to Senators Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was written in response to a request from the committee as part of its investigation into prewar intelligence claims made by the administration. Intelligence reporting included in the 16-page memo comes from a variety of domestic and foreign agencies, including the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Much of the evidence is detailed, conclusive, and corroborated by multiple sources. Some of it is new information obtained in custodial interviews with high-level al Qaeda terrorists and Iraqi officials, and some of it is more than a decade old. The picture that emerges is one of a history of collaboration between two of America's most determined and dangerous enemies. According to the memo--which lays out the intelligence in 50 numbered points--Iraq-al Qaeda contacts began in 1990 and continued through mid-March 2003, days before the Iraq War began. Most of the numbered passages contain straight, fact-based intelligence reporting, which in some cases includes an evaluation of the credibility of the source. This reporting is often followed by commentary and analysis. The relationship began shortly before the first Gulf War. According to reporting in the memo, bin Laden sent "emissaries to Jordan in 1990 to meet with Iraqi government officials." At some unspecified point in 1991, according to a CIA analysis, "Iraq sought Sudan's assistance to establish links to al Qaeda." The outreach went in both directions. According to 1993 CIA reporting cited in the memo, "bin Laden wanted to expand his organization's capabilities through ties with Iraq." The primary go-between throughout these early stages was Sudanese strongman Hassan al-Turabi, a leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated National Islamic Front. Numerous sources have confirmed this. One defector reported that "al-Turabi was instrumental in arranging the Iraqi-al Qaeda relationship. The defector said Iraq sought al Qaeda influence through its connections with Afghanistan, to facilitate the transshipment of proscribed weapons and equipment to Iraq. In return, Iraq provided al Qaeda with training and instructors." One such confirmation came in a postwar interview with one of Saddam Hussein's henchmen. As the memo details: 4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief in a safe house. The report claimed that Saddam insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes. A decisive moment in the budding relationship came in 1993, when bin Laden faced internal resistance to his cooperation with Saddam. 5. A CIA report from a contact with good access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated, said that certain elements in the "Islamic Army" of bin Laden were against the secular regime of Saddam. Overriding the internal factional strife that was developing, bin Laden came to an "understanding" with Saddam that the Islamic Army would no longer support anti-Saddam activities. According to sensitive reporting released in U.S. court documents during the African Embassy trial, in 1993 bin Laden reached an "understanding" with Saddam under which he (bin Laden) forbade al Qaeda operations to be mounted against the Iraqi leader. Another facilitator of the relationship during the mid-1990s was Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi). Abu Hajer, now in a New York prison, was described in court proceedings related to the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as bin Laden's "best friend." According to CIA reporting dating back to the Clinton administration, bin Laden trusted him to serve as a liaison with Saddam's regime and tasked him with procurement of weapons of mass destruction for al Qaeda. FBI reporting in the memo reveals that Abu Hajer "visited Iraq in early 1995" and "had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence. Sometime before mid-1995 he went on an al Qaeda mission to discuss unspecified cooperation with the Iraqi government." Some of the reporting about the relationship throughout the mid-1990s comes from a source who had intimate knowledge of bin Laden and his dealings. This source, according to CIA analysis, offered "the most credible information" on cooperation between bin Laden and Iraq. This source's reports read almost like a diary. Specific dates of when bin Laden flew to various cities are included, as well as names of individuals he met. The source did not offer information on the substantive talks during the meetings. . . . There are not a great many reports in general on the relationship between bin Laden and Iraq because of the secrecy surrounding it. But when this source with close access provided a "window" into bin Laden's activities, bin Laden is seen as heavily involved with Iraq (and Iran). Reporting from the early 1990s remains somewhat sketchy, though multiple sources place Hassan al-Turabi and Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's current No. 2, at the center of the relationship. The reporting gets much more specific in the mid-1990s: 8. Reporting from a well placed source disclosed that bin Laden was receiving training on bomb making from the IIS's [Iraqi Intelligence Service] principal technical expert on making sophisticated explosives, Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed. Brigadier Salim was observed at bin Laden's farm in Khartoum in Sept.-Oct. 1995 and again in July 1996, in the company of the Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti. 9 . . . Bin Laden visited Doha, Qatar (17-19 Jan. 1996), staying at the residence of a member of the Qatari ruling family. He discussed the successful movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and U.K. interests in Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar, using clandestine al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return, bin Laden met with Hijazi and Turabi, among others. And later more reporting, from the same "well placed" source: 10. The Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti, met privately with bin Laden at his farm in Sudan in July 1996. Tikriti used an Iraqi delegation traveling to Khartoum to discuss bilateral cooperation as his "cover" for his own entry into Sudan to meet with bin Laden and Hassan al-Turabi. The Iraqi intelligence chief and two other IIS officers met at bin Laden's farm and discussed bin Laden's request for IIS technical assistance in: a) making letter and parcel bombs; b) making bombs which could be placed on aircraft and detonated by changes in barometric pressure; and c) making false passport [sic]. Bin Laden specifically requested that [Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed], Iraqi intelligence's premier explosives maker--especially skilled in making car bombs--remain with him in Sudan. The Iraqi intelligence chief instructed Salim to remain in Sudan with bin Laden as long as required. The analysis of those events follows: The time of the visit from the IIS director was a few weeks after the Khobar Towers bombing. The bombing came on the third anniversary of a U.S. [Tomahawk missile] strike on IIS HQ (retaliation for the attempted assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait) for which Iraqi officials explicitly threatened retaliation. IN ADDITION TO THE CONTACTS CLUSTERED in the mid-1990s, intelligence reports detail a flurry of activities in early 1998 and again in December 1998. A "former senior Iraqi intelligence officer" reported that "the Iraqi intelligence service station in Pakistan was Baghdad's point of contact with al Qaeda. He also said bin Laden visited Baghdad in Jan. 1998 and met with Tariq Aziz." 11. According to sensitive reporting, Saddam personally sent Faruq Hijazi, IIS deputy director and later Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, to meet with bin Laden at least twice, first in Sudan and later in Afghanistan in 1999. . . . 14. According to a sensitive reporting [from] a "regular and reliable source," [Ayman al] Zawahiri, a senior al Qaeda operative, visited Baghdad and met with the Iraqi Vice President on 3 February 1998. The goal of the visit was to arrange for coordination between Iraq and bin Laden and establish camps in an-Nasiriyah and Iraqi Kurdistan under the leadership of Abdul Aziz. That visit came as the Iraqis intensified their defiance of the U.N. inspection regime, known as UNSCOM, created by the cease-fire agreement following the Gulf War. UNSCOM demanded access to Saddam's presidential palaces that he refused to provide. As the tensions mounted, President Bill Clinton went to the Pentagon on February 18, 1998, and prepared the nation for war. He warned of "an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized international criminals" and said "there is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein." The day after this speech, according to documents unearthed in April 2003 in the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters by journalists Mitch Potter and Inigo Gilmore, Hussein's intelligence service wrote a memo detailing coming meetings with a bin Laden representative traveling to Baghdad. Each reference to bin Laden had been covered by liquid paper that, when revealed, exposed a plan to increase cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda. According to that memo, the IIS agreed to pay for "all the travel and hotel costs inside Iraq to gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden." The document set as the goal for the meeting a discussion of "the future of our relationship with him, bin Laden, and to achieve a direct meeting with him." The al Qaeda representative, the document went on to suggest, might provide "a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden." Four days later, on February 23, 1998, bin Laden issued his now-famous fatwa on the plight of Iraq, published in the Arabic-language daily, al Quds al-Arabi: "For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples." Bin Laden urged his followers to act: "The ruling to kill all Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it." Although war was temporarily averted by a last-minute deal brokered by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, tensions soon rose again. The standoff with Iraq came to a head in December 1998, when President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a 70-hour bombing campaign that began on December 16 and ended three days later, on December 19, 1998. According to press reports at the time, Faruq Hijazi, deputy director of Iraqi Intelligence, met with bin Laden in Afghanistan on December 21, 1998, to offer bin Laden safe haven in Iraq. CIA reporting in the memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee seems to confirm this meeting and relates two others. 15. A foreign government service reported that an Iraqi delegation, including at least two Iraqi intelligence officers formerly assigned to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, met in late 1998 with bin Laden in Afghanistan. 16. According to CIA reporting, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two Iraqi intelligence officers in Afghanistan in Dec. 1998. 17. . . . Iraq sent an intelligence officer to Afghanistan to seek closer ties to bin Laden and the Taliban in late 1998. The source reported that the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim "elements" to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests. After a senior Iraqi intelligence officer met with Taliban leader [Mullah] Omar, arrangements were made for a series of meetings between the Iraqi intelligence officer and bin Laden in Pakistan. The source noted Faruq Hijazi was in Afghanistan in late 1998. 18. . . . Faruq Hijazi went to Afghanistan in 1999 along with several other Iraqi officials to meet with bin Laden. The source claimed that Hijazi would have met bin Laden only at Saddam's explicit direction. An analysis that follows No. 18 provides additional context and an explanation of these reports: Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. None of the reports have information on operational details or the purpose of such meetings. The covert nature of the relationship would indicate strict compartmentation [sic] of operations. Information about connections between al Qaeda and Iraq was so widespread by early 1999 that it made its way into the mainstream press. A January 11, 1999, Newsweek story ran under this headline: "Saddam + Bin Laden?" The story cited an "Arab intelligence source" with knowledge of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. "According to this source, Saddam expected last month's American and British bombing campaign to go on much longer than it did. The dictator believed that as the attacks continued, indignation would grow in the Muslim world, making his terrorism offensive both harder to trace and more effective. With acts of terror contributing to chaos in the region, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait might feel less inclined to support Washington. Saddam's long-term strategy, according to several sources, is to bully or cajole Muslim countries into breaking the embargo against Iraq, without waiting for the United Nations to lift if formally." INTELLIGENCE REPORTS about the nature of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda from mid-1999 through 2003 are conflicting. One senior Iraqi intelligence officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, "said that the last contact between the IIS and al Qaeda was in July 1999. Bin Laden wanted to meet with Saddam, he said. The guidance sent back from Saddam's office reportedly ordered Iraqi intelligence to refrain from any further contact with bin Laden and al Qaeda. The source opined that Saddam wanted to distance himself from al Qaeda." The bulk of reporting on the relationship contradicts this claim. One report states that "in late 1999" al Qaeda set up a training camp in northern Iraq that "was operational as of 1999." Other reports suggest that the Iraqi regime contemplated several offers of safe haven to bin Laden throughout 1999. 23. . . . Iraqi officials were carefully considering offering safe haven to bin Laden and his closest collaborators in Nov. 1999. The source indicated the idea was put forward by the presumed head of Iraqi intelligence in Islamabad (Khalid Janaby) who in turn was in frequent contact and had good relations with bin Laden. Some of the most intriguing intelligence concerns an Iraqi named Ahmed Hikmat Shakir: 24. According to sensitive reporting, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national (Shakir) facilitated the arrival of one of the Sept 11 hijackers for an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Jan 2000). Sensitive reporting indicates Shakir's travel and contacts link him to a worldwide network of terrorists, including al Qaeda. Shakir worked at the Kuala Lumpur airport--a job he claimed to have obtained through an Iraqi embassy employee. One of the men at that al Qaeda operational meeting in the Kuala Lumpur Hotel was Tawfiz al Atash, a top bin Laden lieutenant later identified as the mastermind of the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole. 25. Investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 by al Qaeda revealed no specific Iraqi connections but according to the CIA, "fragmentary evidence points to possible Iraqi involvement." 26. During a custodial interview, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was tasked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for CBW-related [Chemical and Biological Weapons] training beginning in Dec 2000. Iraqi intelligence was "encouraged" after the embassy and USS Cole bombings to provide this training. The analysis of this report follows. CIA maintains that Ibn al-Shaykh's timeline is consistent with other sensitive reporting indicating that bin Laden asked Iraq in 1998 for advanced weapons, including CBW and "poisons." Additional reporting also calls into question the claim that relations between Iraq and al Qaeda cooled after mid-1999: 27. According to sensitive CIA reporting, . . . the Saudi National Guard went on a kingdom-wide state of alert in late Dec 2000 after learning Saddam agreed to assist al Qaeda in attacking U.S./U.K. interests in Saudi Arabia. And then there is the alleged contact between lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague. The reporting on those links suggests not one meeting, but as many as four. What's more, the memo reveals potential financing of Atta's activities by Iraqi intelligence. The Czech counterintelligence service reported that the Sept. 11 hijacker [Mohamed] Atta met with the former Iraqi intelligence chief in Prague, [Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir] al Ani, on several occasions. During one of these meetings, al Ani ordered the IIS finance officer to issue Atta funds from IIS financial holdings in the Prague office. And the commentary: CIA can confirm two Atta visits to Prague--in Dec. 1994 and in June 2000; data surrounding the other two--on 26 Oct 1999 and 9 April 2001--is complicated and sometimes contradictory and CIA and FBI cannot confirm Atta met with the IIS. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross continues to stand by his information. It's not just Gross who stands by the information. Five high-ranking members of the Czech government have publicly confirmed meetings between Atta and al Ani. The meeting that has gotten the most press attention--April 9, 2001--is also the most widely disputed. Even some of the most hawkish Bush administration officials are privately skeptical that Atta met al Ani on that occasion. They believe that reports of the alleged meeting, said to have taken place in public, outside the headquarters of the U.S.-financed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, suggest a level of sloppiness that doesn't fit the pattern of previous high-level Iraq-al Qaeda contacts. Whether or not that specific meeting occurred, the report by Czech counterintelligence that al Ani ordered the Iraqi Intelligence Service officer to provide IIS funds to Atta might help explain the lead hijacker's determination to reach Prague, despite significant obstacles, in the spring of 2000. (Note that the report stops short of confirming that the funds were transferred. It claims only that the IIS officer requested the transfer.) Recall that Atta flew to Prague from Germany on May 30, 2000, but was denied entry because he did not have a valid visa. Rather than simply return to Germany and fly directly to the United States, his ultimate destination, Atta took pains to get to Prague. After he was refused entry the first time, he traveled back to Germany, obtained the proper paperwork, and caught a bus back to Prague. He left for the United States the day after arriving in Prague for the second time. Several reports indicate that the relationship between Saddam and bin Laden continued, even after the September 11 attacks: 31. An Oct. 2002 . . . report said al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons. The agreement reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq. The report also said that al Qaeda members involved in a fraudulent passport network for al Qaeda had been directed to procure 90 Iraqi and Syrian passports for al Qaeda personnel. The analysis that accompanies that report indicates that the report fits the pattern of Iraq-al Qaeda collaboration: References to procurement of false passports from Iraq and offers of safe haven previously have surfaced in CIA source reporting considered reliable. Intelligence reports to date have maintained that Iraqi support for al Qaeda usually involved providing training, obtaining passports, and offers of refuge. This report adds to that list by including weapons and money. This assistance would make sense in the aftermath of 9-11. Colin Powell, in his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N. Security Council, revealed the activities of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Reporting in the memo expands on Powell's case and might help explain some of the resistance the U.S. military is currently facing in Iraq. 37. Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi's procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere. 38. According to sensitive reporting, a contact with good access who does not have an established reporting record: An Iraqi intelligence service officer said that as of mid-March the IIS was providing weapons to al Qaeda members located in northern Iraq, including rocket propelled grenade (RPG)-18 launchers. According to IIS information, northern Iraq-based al Qaeda members believed that the U.S. intended to strike al Qaeda targets during an anticipated assault against Ansar al-Islam positions. The memo further reported pre-war intelligence which "claimed that an Iraqi intelligence official, praising Ansar al-Islam, provided it with $100,000 and agreed to continue to give assistance." CRITICS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION have complained that Iraq-al Qaeda connections are a fantasy, trumped up by the warmongers at the White House to fit their preconceived notions about international terror; that links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have been routinely "exaggerated" for political purposes; that hawks "cherry-picked" bits of intelligence and tendentiously presented these to the American public. Carl Levin, a senior member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made those points as recently as November 9, in an appearance on "Fox News Sunday." Republicans on the committee, he complained, refuse to look at the administration's "exaggeration of intelligence." Said Levin: "The question is whether or not they exaggerated intelligence in order to carry out their purpose, which was to make the case for going to war. Did we know, for instance, with certainty that there was any relationship between the Iraqis and the terrorists that were in Afghanistan, bin Laden? The administration said that there's a connection between those terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Was there a basis for that?" There was, as shown in the memo to the committee on which Levin serves. And much of the reporting comes from Clinton-era intelligence. Not that you would know this from Al Gore's recent public statements. Indeed, the former vice president claims to be privy to new "evidence" that the administration lied. In an August speech at New York University, Gore claimed: "The evidence now shows clearly that Saddam did not want to work with Osama bin Laden at all, much less give him weapons of mass destruction." Really? One of the most interesting things to note about the 16-page memo is that it covers only a fraction of the evidence that will eventually be available to document the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. For one thing, both Saddam and bin Laden were desperate to keep their cooperation secret. (Remember, Iraqi intelligence used liquid paper on an internal intelligence document to conceal bin Laden's name.) For another, few people in the U.S. government are expressly looking for such links. There is no Iraq-al Qaeda equivalent of the CIA's 1,400-person Iraq Survey Group currently searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. Instead, CIA and FBI officials are methodically reviewing Iraqi intelligence files that survived the three-week war last spring. These documents would cover several miles if laid end-to-end. And they are in Arabic. They include not only connections between bin Laden and Saddam, but also revolting details of the regime's long history of brutality. It will be a slow process. So Feith's memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee is best viewed as sort of a "Cliff's Notes" version of the relationship. It contains the highlights, but it is far from exhaustive. One example. The memo contains only one paragraph on Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, the Iraqi facilitator who escorted two September 11 hijackers through customs in Kuala Lumpur. U.S. intelligence agencies have extensive reporting on his activities before and after the September 11 hijacking. That they would include only this brief overview suggests the 16-page memo, extensive as it is, just skims the surface of the reporting on Iraq-al Qaeda connections. Other intelligence reports indicate that Shakir whisked not one but two September 11 hijackers--Khalid al Midhar and Nawaq al Hamzi--through the passport and customs process upon their arrival in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000. Shakir then traveled with the hijackers to the Kuala Lumpur Hotel where they met with Ramzi bin al Shibh, one of the masterminds of the September 11 plot. The meeting lasted three days. Shakir returned to work on January 9 and January 10, and never again. Shakir got his airport job through a contact at the Iraqi Embassy. (Iraq routinely used its embassies as staging grounds for its intelligence operations; in some cases, more than half of the alleged "diplomats" were intelligence operatives.) The Iraqi embassy, not his employer, controlled Shakir's schedule. He was detained in Qatar on September 17, 2001. Authorities found in his possession contact information for terrorists involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 embassy bombings, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and the September 11 hijackings. The CIA had previous reporting that Shakir had received a phone call from the safe house where the 1993 World Trade Center attacks had been plotted. | ||
| Michael Janay Citizen Username: Childprotect Post Number: 80 Registered: 1-2003 |
The Qataris released Shakir shortly after his arrest. On October 21, 2001, he flew to Amman, Jordan, where he was to change planes to a flight to Baghdad. He didn't make that flight. Shakir was detained in Jordan for three months, where the CIA interrogated him. His interrogators concluded that Shakir had received extensive training in counter-interrogation techniques. Not long after he was detained, according to an official familiar with the intelligence, the Iraqi regime began to "pressure" Jordanian intelligence to release him. At the same time, Amnesty International complained that Shakir was being held without charge. The Jordanians released him on January 28, 2002, at which point he is believed to have fled back to Iraq. Was Shakir an Iraqi agent? Does he provide a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11? We don't know. We may someday find out. But there can no longer be any serious argument about whether Saddam Hussein's Iraq worked with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to plot against Americans. | ||
| Michael Janay Citizen Username: Childprotect Post Number: 81 Registered: 1-2003 |
The Way Forward By JALAL TALABANI BAGHDAD -- It has been my privilege to preside over the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) during a month of momentous events. We now have an agreement for the transfer of authority between the Coalition, the liberators, and the IGC, the representatives of the liberated Iraqis. President Bush has outlined an inspiring vision for a free and democratic Middle East. Our American friends are resolutely striking back at the vicious remnants of Saddam's regime and damaging the network of Baathists and foreign Islamists attempting to destroy the Iraqi experiment in democracy. Yet these gains could easily be forfeited if we Iraqis do not bear the brunt of the fighting. * * * The enemies of Iraqi freedom are not "resistance," a word that evokes the heroism of Poles in the Second World War, nobly battling their occupiers. Nor can those who murder our American liberators, Red Cross workers, U.N. officials and Italian policemen be termed "guerrillas." Rather, they are terrorists. They are the thugs and torturers who repressed their fellow Iraqis during the last 35 years, the perpetrators of genocide, men who butchered hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Marsh Arabs and Shiite Arabs. The creation of an anti-democratic fascist counter-revolution of Baathists and foreign Islamic volunteers, some of whom are al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam, is a classic unholy Middle Eastern alliance. These people have more support among the Arab media and in the studios of al-Jazeera than they do in Iraq. The significance of this wave of terrorism is not military, but political. On the battlefield the terrorists are losing. But the terrorists have grasped something that too few in the U.S. will admit: that Iraq is now the central front both in the war against terrorism and the struggle for a better Middle East. The terrorists will not stop fighting if the U.S. troops are withdrawn, rather they will become emboldened to believe that they can win this conflict. Only the U.S. was capable of toppling Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, a brilliantly executed campaign in which the Kurdish guerrillas, the peshmerga, were the only Iraqis to take casualties fighting with the Coalition. The defeat of the terrorists, however, must be largely an Iraqi endeavour. By taking up arms and routing the terrorists, Iraqis will own their new democracy -- nobody will be able to say that it has been handed to them. Two measures must be taken so that Iraqis can fight side by side with your brave GIs. First, we need to use existing Iraqi patriotic forces. There are over 60,000 peshmerga who have fought alongside the Coalition and who are keen to contribute. We accept the sensitivities that preclude using Kurdish troops in Arab areas. However, the peshmerga can be used to provide backup and guard facilities, as well as protect the borders of our country, thereby freeing up Iraqi forces for operations in the Sunni Triangle. Second, the new Iraqi army, police and intelligence services must be trained by the Coalition and dedicated to defending democracy. Resurrecting the former Iraqi army is not an option. The Iraqi army had a record of internal repression and external aggression. L. Paul Bremer, the Coalition's administrator, demonstrated great wisdom when he formally wound up the Iraqi army. Like the Allied decree in 1946 that dissolved Prussia, the edict abolishing the Iraqi army struck at the roots of the Arab nationalist militarism that plagued Iraq even before Saddam. Those advocating the recall of the former Iraqi army are propounding the "stability first" policy that President Bush rejected with his Nov. 6 speech. The Iraqi peoples were victims of the "stability" imposed by the Iraqi army. All patriotic Iraqis will have been heartened when President Bush said that "60 years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty." Our battle against the terrorists will be long and painful, but while we fight we will continue to rebuild. Iraq is often falsely described as a mess, even a quagmire. Yet seven months after liberation, Iraq is making impressive progress by any standard. It is a testament to the determination of all of Iraq's peoples, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmens and Assyrians alike, that they have persevered in the face of a merciless terrorist campaign. What is happening in Iraq is not, however, the restoration of normality, because in Saddam's Iraq there was no such thing. Rather, it is a courageous and necessary attempt to create the basic elements of a decent, democratic society in a place where human dignity was relentlessly crushed under foot. Iraqi Kurdistan's experience of self-government, tolerance and civil-society building over the last 12 years is now being extended to the whole of Iraq. In Baghdad today, there are scores of newspapers and nearly as many political parties. For the first time in 35 years the basic issues facing Iraq can be loudly debated in public rather than fearfully whispered behind closed doors. Iraq today is a success. It was Iraq under Saddam that was a "mess," where mass graves were "normality." Critically, Iraq is finally benefiting from its own resources. Under Saddam, Iraq gave cheap oil to the region to buy influence, while wasting oil revenues on arms and palaces. So while oil production is still below prewar levels, our net oil revenues are probably higher now that Baathist waste has been eliminated. Most of Iraq is now peaceful. Iraqi Kurdistan and largely Shiite Arab southern Iraq have suffered relatively little violence. The localized terrorist problem in the Sunni Arab "triangle" and parts of Baghdad should not deter foreign investors. Rather they should build on the success of the Madrid donors' conference. Entrepreneurs and foreign lenders, such as the World Bank, should begin operating in Iraqi Kurdistan and southern Iraq. Some foreign firms have already teamed up with Iraqi enterprises to reconstruct Iraq. They know that Iraq is ripe for foreign investment and development. Iraq needs to attract foreign investment to create the private-sector jobs that our state-enterprise dominated economy so desperately needs. The terrorists want our bid for democracy to fail, just as the same terrorists attempted in recent years to undermine self-rule in Iraqi Kurdistan. The courage of the U.S. and Britain in liberating Iraq was a blow to the negative forces in the Middle East, to the Arab chauvinism and Islamist radicalism that so murderously combined to commit the atrocity of September 11. These terrorists know that if they are defeated in Iraq, then they will be defeated everywhere, but that if they can make the U.S. stumble or lose its nerve in Iraq, then their cause is not yet lost. It is for Iraqis to prove them wrong. Mr. Talabani is the current president of the Iraq Governing Council and secretary-general of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. | ||
| strawberry Citizen Username: Strawberry Post Number: 1441 Registered: 10-2001 |
Michael is correct. It's been 20 minutes since we last heard from Nohero. Told ya he's chicken. "That moment has directly affected my foreign policy. See, it changed the nature of the presidency. It changed the security arrangements of the United States of America. I vowed to the American people I would never forget the lessons of September the 11th, 2001." --President George W. Bush | ||
| Dr. Winston O'Boogie Citizen Username: Casey Post Number: 296 Registered: 8-2003  |
it would take more than 20 minutes just to read the last 3 posts. | ||
| strawberry Citizen Username: Strawberry Post Number: 1442 Registered: 10-2001 |
Since Nohero is once again proving he can't answer one simple question he claims is harming U.S. policy in Iraq, would anyone else care to give it a try? How has Chalabi effected policy in Iraq in a negative way? Nohero, raises the concern because he read an article in Newsweek, but when he's asked to explain exactly what the concern is..we get a big fat DUH. Nohero, I'm making chicken clucks right now, thinking of you. "That moment has directly affected my foreign policy. See, it changed the nature of the presidency. It changed the security arrangements of the United States of America. I vowed to the American people I would never forget the lessons of September the 11th, 2001." --President George W. Bush | ||
| Dr. Winston O'Boogie Citizen Username: Casey Post Number: 297 Registered: 8-2003 |
Chalabi (a man who had not set foot in Iraq in 40 years) was the source of much of the bad intelligence the US collected on Iraq. He convinced the US that they would be welcomed as liberators by all Iraqis. Thanks in part to his info, the US was not prepared properly for the rebuilding effort. | ||
| Nohero Citizen Username: Nohero Post Number: 2458 Registered: 10-1999 |
Thanks for holding down the fort, Doc, while I did some reading. I had not read the Newsweek article referenced by Straw, so I went looking for it. It's really more of the same types of information which has been available in news reports about how our country's approach to Iraq has been structured, re-structured, and fiddled with. Just a few recent pieces (since I know how upset some of you would be if there were no links): Thomas Friedman (Not a big "anti-war" guy): Or, Fareed Zakaria (Not a "bring the troops home now" guy): Or, David Ignatius of the Washington Post (Not a "Bush-basher"): Or are they also whining, half-ass, mininformed bleeding heart liberals? | ||
| Michael Janay Citizen Username: Childprotect Post Number: 82 Registered: 1-2003 |
Come on, no one thought that ALL Iraqis would welcome the US. No one. What they thought is that the vast majority of the Iraqi people would welcome the liberators. That is what has happened and is happening. A tiny fraction of terrorists does not represent the Iraqi people. What bad intelligence did he give the US? Please link. | ||
| Dr. Winston O'Boogie Citizen Username: Casey Post Number: 298 Registered: 8-2003 |
Michael, Chalabi was distrusted by the CIA practically from day one. The politicians glommed onto him because he told them what they wanted to hear (sound familiar?). He was one of the reasons for the split in the Bush Admin between the intelligence services and the politicians. Here's a link, from last fall (note, from before the war, before all the second-guessing started). Even if you support the war, I would think you'd question the use of Chalabi as a source. No matter how you slice it, his BS helped get the U.S. into some circumstances they weren't quite ready for. http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/ron_hutcheson/6082423 .htm | ||
| Dave Ross Supporter Username: Dave Post Number: 5732 Registered: 4-1998  |
Why won't the Weekly Standard release the entire report? Why are they just releasing selective points? Why won't they SHARE the information with other MORE REPUTABLE publications? Not anti-war publications. Release it to the editorial board of the pro-war Washington Post. I think we know why. It simply won't bear scrutiny. This is the textbook reason we have a free press and why one source (The Weekly Standard) cannot be the single font of "truth". | ||
| strawberry Citizen Username: Strawberry Post Number: 1444 Registered: 10-2001 |
Once again, Nohero relies on others to stress his opinion, which is really the opinion of others. This time it was: DOC FRIEDMAN AND CO. At least Doc has the balls to post his opinions, in his own words making him a legit if fouled poster. Also, you gotta love these experts like Friedman who seem to think an Iraqi constitution should already be a completed document, in writing and approved. Of course, these other little things such as forming Police, military, and intelligence officers, not to mention opening schools, and feeding those with no food, while securing the oil don't count as accomplishments. All this despite the heavy fighting and resistance being chaired by Hussein loyalists and AL QAEDA, (you know, that little terror group that we're supposed to believe never had dealings with Iraq) ALL this while the search for weapons that Bill Clinton and Tony Blair among others say Hussein has continues. Sorry Nohero, Chalabi isn't our problem now, and for you to even mention his name as some type of excuse as to why Bush had no right to attack Terror after nine-eleven is unacceptable. "That moment has directly affected my foreign policy. See, it changed the nature of the presidency. It changed the security arrangements of the United States of America. I vowed to the American people I would never forget the lessons of September the 11th, 2001." --President George W. Bush | ||
| Cliff Harris Citizen Username: Cowboy Post Number: 147 Registered: 9-2003 |
This is for Nohero, tjohn and all of the other Bush haters on MOL. No matter what the President does, nobody is allowed to say, "Excuse me, but was that really the most sensible way to get the job done?" 1)Excuse me, but what is your alternative strategy? 2)Excuse me, but what would you suggest be done instead? I, like many others, have no problem listening to alternative approaches that deal with resolving the situation at hand, but I do have a major problem with people who only whine and criticize. I don't mind when the argument offers up a better method to accomplish the task at hand. What I do have trouble with is folks who can only find fault and blame our president. Time to put up or shut up! Yes it is American to be skeptical of our government. I happen to be extremely skeptical of many government programs, I think far too many are wasteful. tjohn you say "criticism of our government when it is wrong is now to be considered appeasement of our enemies." So, please be specific, how is our government wrong in this situation? What should be done instead? What is right? What is the better plan? Don't have one? Then how do you go about proving it is wrong? Can't you see how it might appease a terrorist to see the pure hatred of any move made by our president? It must please them to know our country has numerous Bush haters waiting to pounce on anything he does, yet those very same never offer up any viable alternative plans. It must give hope to any terrorist to know that their efforts at killing Americans in Iraq will continue to fuel the anti-war, anti-Bush, efforts here in America. They must feel if enough soldiers die then the American public might become frustrated enough to elect a Howard Dean, or anyone but Bush. They would be glad to see someone like Al Gore at the helm, or even a John Kerry. | ||
| Nohero Citizen Username: Nohero Post Number: 2461 Registered: 10-1999 |
Straw, last time I checked none of us were accredited foreign policy experts, or were reporting from on the ground in Bahgdad. We all have opinions based on what we have read. If you disagree, that's your right; instead, you seem to be doing a bad imitation of Triumph the Insult Comic dog. Same goes for Mr. Harris. People who disagree with you automatically get labels put on them like "Bush-hater". What's the point of continuing a discussion with you? | ||
| lumpyhead Citizen Username: Lumpyhead Post Number: 531 Registered: 3-2002 |
Nohero- Nice try. You are a known Bush hater on this board. | ||
| Nohero Citizen Username: Nohero Post Number: 2462 Registered: 10-1999 |
Bush-disagree-er ... |
